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Introduction 
"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though 
he derives nothingfrom it, except the pleasure of seeing it." 
-Adam Smith (The Theory of Moral Sentiments) 
The last few decades have seen a growing dissatisfaction with the traditional 
measure of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While Kuznets and other originators of the 
measure wanted a way to estimate outputs for the purpose of measuring economic growth 
and formulating fiscal policy, in more recent years the GDP measure has also been 
interpreted as a measure of the standard of living. This kind of interpretation gives 
testament to the growing desire of economists and all social scientists to measure not only 
monetary wealth and income flow, but also social well-being. The aim of this paper is 
thus to evaluate the major shortcomings of GDP as an indicator of human welfare, as well 
as to inquire into which of the alternative measures of GDP gives the most 
comprehensive and valid reading of cross-national well-being. This paper will focus most 
heavily on developing nations. It is in these countries where we tend to find the most 
obvious disparities between the level of per capita GDP and social welfare and it is also 
these countries whose welfare is in the greatest jeopardy (Todaro, 2000). We must also 
make a clear distinction between economic growth and economic development. By 
economic growth we mean the growth of nations on a purely output based scale, where 
GDP would suffice as a positive indicator. By economic development we mean the 
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process by which countries create and maintain satisfactory social, political and economic 
environments so that the process of economic growth may continue. 
While there are several areas relevant to human welfare that are neglected by the 
GDP measure, this paper focuses explicitly on two: Inequality and human health. The 
reason being that they both, as the empirical evidence suggests, have powerful effects on 
human well-being and they are especially consequential to long-run social growth and 
economic development. Yet the GDP measure does not provide any indication of income 
distribution (because it only shows total income flow) or the quality of health related 
services (because these goods and services tend to be distributed through institutions 
rather than traditional markets). Therefore, any legitimate alternative to GDP must at 
least demonstrate an effective incorporation of these two factors. 
CHAPTER I 
The Calculation and Shortcomings of the GDP Measure: 
A Brief Review 
One of the most central goals of the discipline of economics is the measurement 
and improvement of human welfare. How do we accurately measure the well-being of 
individuals and nations in relative terms? There is a huge debate over this issue and 
whether or not the current calculation gives an accurate picture. The generally agreed 
upon method is the measure of national output in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The 
logic is that higher levels of output in GDP demonstrate the potential ability of an 
economy to provide for its citizens. Economic activity correlates with healthier, more 
educated individuals who maintain the ability to choose and act freely. This criterion, on 
the whole, tends be representative of greater aggregate welfare. Thus we can say (in very 
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general terms) that countries with higher levels ofGDP have relatively higher levels of 
total welfare (Miles and Scott, 2005, pp.13-14 ), as illustrated by Dasgupta. It is true 
however, that GDP as a measure of welfare has its shortcomings. The most pervasive 
arguments against the accuracy of GDP present a series of relevant items for which GDP 
fails to account. Among these are environmental damage and depletion, illegal economic 
activity, unpaid domestic labor and non-market activities. Also of importance is the level 
of inequality between groups and the degree of substantive freedoms enjoyed by citizens 
of various countries. 
It is important to clarify that when we say that GDP does not give an accurate 
portrayal of well-being we do not necessarily assume that it is supposed to or was even 
intended to show explicitly the differences in the welfare between nations. In fact, the 
formal definition of GDP does not mention the measurement of well-being as one of its 
functions . The US Bureau of Economic Analysis defines the national income and product 
accounts (NIP A) as one of four major branches of national accounting (which 
encompasses the GDP measure) for the purpose of illuminating workings, structure and 
performance of the US economy. The NIP A, in particular, measures the composition and 
total economic value of output. The purpose of these accounts is twofold: First, to show 
the level of output, its size and uses, and second, to illuminate the economic processes by 
which the output is produced and distributed (BEA, 2006). 
The logic behind the calculation of GDP is quite intuitive. GDP, the most formal 
measurement of a nation's net welfare, is the sum total value of all final goods and 
services produced within a country in a given year in current dollar terms. This can be 
expressed in two ways. First, as the prevailing market price multiplied by all goods and 
services (nominal GDP) or as the sum of all goods and services produced, multiplied by a 
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fixed price at a base year (real GDP) (Nzier, 2005). The latter accounts for inflationary 
changes may distort the appearance of real growth rates over time, and is, for this reason, 
traditionally preferred by economists in measuring economic performance from one year 
to the next. It is also important to note that GDP is a measurement of all final goods and 
services. If it were to measure the sum cumulative of all transactions then many 
intermediate goods would be double counted. Another way around this problem of 
double counting is to add the "value added" of each industry involved in the production 
of any one good. In other words, it is the value that each intermediate industry adds to the 
end value of the final good, which can be calculated by adding the additional mark up 
that each industry charges on the sale of their good to the next buyer (Miles and Scott, 
2005, pp. 18). 
From this basic method of GDP calculation, we can infer other identical (in 
theory) methods of measuring these aggregates. The aforementioned method is known as 
the "output" approach, which is theoretically identical to the "income" and "expenditure" 
approaches. It goes without saying that the industries that create the "value added" use 
factors of production like labor, land and capital, to which they must pay wages and rents 
respectively. In a very simplified economy where no leakages exist, all the payments 
received by the firm for its goods and services will be paid back in the long run to the 
labor and capital requisite in its production, and thus an identity is created. The sum of all 
the value added by industries in production (measured in monetary terms) will be equal to 
the value (in monetary terms) paid out to the factors. This measurement is known as the 
Income measure of GDP (Mankiw, 2005). Similarly, if we disregard the value-added 
approach and simply add the value of all final goods and services, we arrive at the 
Expenditure measure ofGDP, which adds the total consumption in the private sector, 
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total government expenditures, total investment expenditures and net exports 
(C+I+G+Nx), which comprises the sum total of aggregate demand. This approach to 
GDP calculation is also theoretically identical to the other two approaches. This is true 
because if we assume that in the long run aggregate demand must equal aggregate supply, 
then C+I+G+Nx will equal the total value added, and thus also equal the total factor 
payments (Mankiw, 2005). Thus, all three methods of accounting will arrive at a similar 
estimate of GDP. 
As mentioned earlier, there are several problems with this method of welfare 
measurement. Even if we disregard the question of whether or not GDP is a good welfare 
indicator, there is still the question of whether or not GDP accurately accounts for all 
economic activity within a country. One of the major claims against the GDP indicator is 
that it gives an incomplete picture of economic activity because it only focuses on strictly 
legal market based activity. Those activities that do affect the general welfare of a nation, 
but for which there is no proper market, are commonly overlooked in national accounts 
(Miles and Scott, 2005, pp. 26). Consider first, the fact that much of the productive labor 
in an economy is unpaid, such as domestic labor, child rearing and caring for the sick or 
elderly. It is self-evident that this sort of labor adds to the welfare of a nation, yet because 
GDP only encapsulates paid labor, much of the real work done in a society goes 
unaccounted for. 
United Nations Platform for Action Committee (UNPAC) estimates that in 
Canada, between 30.6% and 41.4% of total labor is overlooked by GDP calculations, and 
that in developing nations the figure becomes substantially higher. In Belarus for 
example, the figure rises to somewhere between 60.1% and 70.4% thus resulting in a 
highly distorted calculation of net welfare (Dresher, 1999). This miscalculation in GDP 
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accounting also has severe social implications, especially in the case of unpaid domestic 
labor. Because women do much of the unaccounted labor, this miscalculation suggests an 
element of social subjugation, such that GDP "values" men's work to a greater degree 
than women's (Dresher, 1999). However, empirical evidence on the subject is lacking. 
A second discrepancy in the traditional national accounting method is that it omits 
the use of environmental resources, as well as the costs of environmental degradation to 
society. For instance, GDP calculates the amount of crude oil pumped from the earth and 
sold on the market, but many argue that the depletion of oil reserves from the earth 
should be subtracted (because using finite resources makes us poorer, not richer) 
(Kolstad, 2000, pp.279). An additional environmental problem is that of dealing with 
externalities. Because of the lack of markets in existence, firms (or individuals) impose 
costs on other firms (or individuals) without proper reimbursement. This idea is 
illustrated by the example of a firm's production process polluting the air. Although the 
production is a positive addition to GDP, the externality (pollution) is a negative cost to 
society, for which the firm does not pay, and is hence omitted from GDP. (Kolstad, 2000, 
pp. 280). It is also quite possible that the cost of environmental clean up (which should be 
a negative cost) is also added to the national accounts, which implies an even larger 
discrepancy. Roger Levette in his article "Sustainability Indicators: Integrating Quality of 
Life and Environmental Protection", argues for the creation of an indicator that would 
establish a crude proxy for quality of life through the level of environmental 
sustainability. Such an indicator would account not only for output, but also the depletion 
of finite resources used in the process and the cost of replacing those resources (Levette, 
1998). 
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A parallel argument offered up by Herman Daly in his article "Beyond Growth: 
The Economics of Sustainable Development" suggests that productive human activities 
and the continual exchange of goods and services throughout the world economy are 
made possible largely at the expense of our ecosystem. The manipulation of the earth's 
resources uses up "terrestrial stock" (the Earth's finite resources) at such an extraordinary 
rate that the natural process of replacement cannot keep up. Furthermore, Daly argues 
that these extractions are not properly priced by market mechanisms, and in many cases 
the enormous cost of depleting such resources is not accounted for at all. To illustrate this 
pricing problem, Daly invokes a very simple, yet profound insight: That we attribute no 
intrinsic value to the Earths resources. A tree's value is only commensurate to the cost of 
cutting it down and converting it to lumber, yet this ad hoc "value added" approach 
attaches no real value the tree itself (Molotch, 1998). The argument is simple, if we do 
not account for the depletion of "terrestrial stock," we give no incentive to moderate 
environmentally taxing economic activity that could have serious consequences in the 
long run. 
A third scenario in which GDP fails to account for some welfare dependant 
variables is the case of illegal economic activity. This would include things like theft, tax 
evasion, the selling of illegal or contraband goods (i.e. drugs, weapons, sex, pirated 
goods, etc.), as well as informal or "underground" markets, these would include 
economic activity which is not necessarily illegal, but simply unregistered. Because these 
activities have a definite welfare effect (positive or negative), it is argued that GDP 
should incorporate them into its figures as well. This is a compelling argument 
considering the fact that in a few economies (all of which are considered "developing"), 
it is estimated that "black market" activity accounts for up to 70% of all economic 
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activity (Miles and Scott, 2005, pp. 26-27)! The question then remains; how should the 
national aggregates be adjusted to account for all this previously neglected material? 
Economists, generally infer the amount of illegal economic activity through several 
different methods. For example, in determining the level of tax evasion, economists can 
get a general figure by simply subtracting the GDP figure calculated by the income 
approach, from the GDP figure calculated by the expenditure approach. If the new figure 
is a positive number (i.e. more money was mysteriously spent, than was earned) then 
there is reason to believe that some income was not submitted to the IRS. Other methods 
of black market measurement include measuring the demand for cash (most black 
markets do not accept Visa), or by looking at the demand for electricity (which in general 
terms, rises proportionately to real economic growth, and thus the discrepancy between 
the two GDP figures would give a good idea of the level of underground economic 
activity). But while these methods may prove to be successful in the more developed 
world, it seems less likely to be the case in under developed economies where the ability 
to conduct such measurements is overly difficult and costly (Smith, 2005). 
It is important to note, that regardless of the amount of problems in GDP 
accounting, it is still widely used and respected as the best indicator of economic activity 
to date. GDP does not claim to be a perfect measure of welfare or human happiness. It is 
merely a broad indication of how economies are performing relative to one another, and 
to that extent, it does a good job. On a general level, GDP figures do tend to show how 
well people are living from one country to the next. For instance, the per capita GDP of 
Mexico is about 23% of that of the US (Human Development Report, 2005), and this 
inequality is strikingly clear to anyone crossing the boarder from San Diego to Tijuana. 
Therefore, it would be highly unwise to wholly discredit its legitimacy. Yet the inherent 
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shortcomings of the GDP measure must be recognized, especially in developing countries 
where those biases are most clearly pronounced. Particular attention must be paid to those 
factors that have a clear and definite effect on welfare but are neglected by the 
aforementioned measures. The remainder of this paper is dedicated to addressing those 
factors, and analyzing the extent to which GDP gives a distorted picture of individual 
well-being. 
A fairly new area of inquiry on the subject of national accounting is the study of 
household production. Australian economist Duncan Ironmonger is a leading researcher 
in this field. Ironmonger argues that the economy has two distinct parts: a market section 
and a household section. In his paper "Counting Outputs, Capital Inputs and Caring 
labor" Ironmonger derives an argument for the inclusion of the household economy into 
GDP calculation. Ironmonger demonstrates through a series of data taken from Australia 
the surprising significance of unpaid domestic labor on the economy. He breaks up 
domestic labor into several categories including (but not limited to) meal preparation, 
laundry and cleaning, child rearing, repairs and maintenance, shopping and voluntary 
community work. While previous studies on the subject provided data for most of these 
categories, they only accounted for the value of the labor input. In this article, however, 
Ironmonger rationalizes that because traditional GDP estimates include both labor and 
capital inputs, an accurate assessment of Gross Household Product (GHP) should also 
include things like housing, vehicles and domestic appliances (the domestic capital 
inputs). The values of all household outputs are measured by using prevailing market 
prices for those activities. For example, the average price of a baby-sitter were $7.00 per 
hour, the same figure would be used to calculate the value of childcare per hour. 
Adopting this method, Ironmonger estimates that GHP is equal to 98% of GDP on 
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average, suggesting that the domestic side is almost equal in size to the entire market 
economy (Ironmonger, 1996). 
Other methods of measuring household production have also been employed in 
estimating output. Statistics Canada has performed a similar study that utilizes a slightly 
different approach and yields different results than the Ironmonger study. Where 
Ironmonger used the "market replacement cost method" (which uses market wage rates 
of individuals involved in similar activities in the market sector), Statistics Canada uses a 
corollary method called the "housekeeper cost method" (which uses the market wage rate 
of a general housekeeper). This method, although similar to Ironmonger's, resulted in a 
dramatically different result. When used to measure the level of household production in 
Canada, it showed that the value ofunpaid work in 1998 was equal to $12,256 per 
person. Total unpaid work was equal to only 33% of Canadian GDP; far less that 
Ironmonger's estimated 98% in Australia (Hamad. 2003). 
Such inconsistencies, however, should not be regarded as grounds for dismissal. 
They are simply the result of the relative newness of this field of inquiry. Regardless of 
the technical discrepancies, the concept of household output is revolutionary. We need to 
address the idea that our standard GDP estimates have only shown half of the picture and 
have continually failed to account for large portions of economic activity. To assess the 
extent to which this miscalculation distorts the level of general welfare between 
countries, we need evidence that GHP and GDP do not rise and fall proportionally. In 
other words, if we were to find that GHP tends to be about 90-100% of GDP in all cases, 
then there would be no real reason to calculate the former. If however statistical evidence 
suggests that many counties with low GDP have disproportionately high GHP and vice 
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versa, we may safely say that GDP alone does not give us a complete picture of welfare 
levels between countries. 
CHAPTER II: 
Relative Income and Inequality. 
Over the course of the last 40 years, the collective fortitude of the world's 
economies has seen a new epoch. GDP growth of the world's most powerful countries 
has steadily improved; new innovations and technologies have saturated global markets 
and propelled productivity to unprecedented levels. The perpetual extraction and 
consumption of the world's resources has reached an all-time high, and in likeness, 
mankind is surely wealthier. Yet if the world's economic growth has produced such 
spectacular results, how can it be that disparities in wealth have continued to grow 
unilaterally? In 1960, the poorest 20% of the world's population held only 2.3% of its 
income, whereas the wealthiest 20% held 70.2%. In contrast, in 1998 the poorest held 
less than 1.2% and the wealthiest were privy to 89% (Statistics from UNDP, 1999). Such 
a question requires an analysis of the nature of international economic growth and its 
effect on inequality while paying special attention to underdeveloped nations. This 
chapter, therefore, argues that inequality is cumbersome to human welfare through its 
negative effects on long run economic growth and development, as well as its negative 
effects on human happiness and well-being. 
If it is true that the process of both growth and development have continued to 
improve over the last 40 years, it seems counterintuitive that the distribution of income 
would necessarily worsen. Yet Simon Kuznets, famous for his empirical work on long 
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run growth patterns of developed nations, suggests that the process of development itself 
tends to deepen inequality in the short run, but lessen inequality over the long run. Thus, 
if we were to measure the relationship graphically, where inequality is measured as a 
Gini coefficient on they-axis and GDP per head on the x-axis, our resulting correlation 
would resemble an inverted U, known as the Kuznets curve. The reasons for this trend 
are numerous. Many economists suggest that structural changes are the leading cause of 
such redistributive forces. If the beginnings of growth are more supportive of a small 
elite industrial sector, as the Lewis Model (1954) suggests (where employment is low but 
relative wages are high), then it is likely that income would move toward the small 
industrial sector and out of the larger, more traditional sectors of the economy, such as 
agriculture. There is also evidence that in less developed nations the imposition of 
transfer payments may be difficult if not impossible because of a weak central 
government, thus intensifying the income gap (Todaro, 2000) (for more information and 
empirical work on the validity of the Kuznets Curve, refer to Timothy Moran: "Kuznets' 
Inverted U Hypothesis"). 
The magnitude of income inequality surely varies a great deal across countries, 
especially when comparisons are made between developed and less developed countries. 
Table 1.1 gives some estimates of income distribution across 15 selected developing 
nations. Given the difficulty in obtaining exact information on this type of data in the 
third world, we must assume a relatively high degree of variability in the figures. Still, 
some general conclusions may be drawn. First, it is evident that the degree of inequality 
in developing countries is disproportionately higher than in the developed world. In 
developing countries the average income of the poorest 20% of the countries in question 
is 5.2%. For the wealthiest 20% the average income is 51 .8%, which is quite high 
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considering that a developed country like Japan has their poorest 20% receiving about 
8.7% of the income, and their wealthiest 20% receiving 37.5% (Todaro, 2000). 
Table 1.2 shows similar data describing the relationship between GNP per capita 
and inequality. The measure of inequality is displayed in three ways: the income share of 
the poorest 40% of households; the ratio of highest 20% to lowest 20%; and the Gini 
coefficient for each country. What is of interest here is that none of the inequality 
measures show any reliable correlation with GNP. Whereas, of the 15 selected countries 
(as of2000), Brazil, Malaysia and Costa Rica, have the 1 s\ 2nd and 3rd highest GNP's per 
capita, they also have the 18\ 4th and 5th highest Gini coefficients, suggesting that if 
anything, GNP correlates positively with inequality. It is also worth noting that by 
comparing Bangladesh and Brazil, the poorest and wealthiest countries respectively; we 
find that Brazil's Gini coefficient is over twice that of Bangladesh, even though Brazil 
out-performs Bangladesh in GNP terms by over 16 to 1. This being the case, it could 
easily be argued that GDP's indication of welfare is distorted. By showing only the level 
of total income and neglecting the size of income distribution, GDP fails to give a 
comprehensive picture of welfare. 
The literature on the subject of growth and inequality is prolific. Yet for the 
purposes of this paper it is only necessary to show that inequality is a prevailing problem 
to the extent that it has a distorting effect on GDP as a welfare indicator, and that the 
damaging effects of gross inequality can have long term effects on the ability of the 
economy to improve its living standard. The most obvious problem is that if inequality is 
high in any given country and we calculate GDP per capita by simply dividing total 
output by the total population, our resulting figure would reflect the true state of skewed 
distribution of income. If, for example, economy A has 10 people and 100 units of 
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output, and one person own 91 units of output and the other 9 people each own only l 
unit of output respectively, then our GDP figure of 10 per head would be highly 
misleading. The traditional GDP growth figure is largely a calculation of the rate of 
growth of the incomes of the wealthiest 40% of the population, while the lower 60% may 
be no better (or worse) off, regardless of the GDP growth rate (Smith, 2005). 
Yet beyond this most obvious shortcoming, there is also evidence that the very 
presence of inequality has a negative effect on welfare and happiness. In other words, 
relative income may have a significant effect on the level of sustainable welfare within a 
country. Samuel A. Stouffer, a sociologist from the University of Pennsylvania, once 
conducted an experiment in which he tested the level of satisfaction among military men 
after a promotion. He found that men in the infantry, where promotions are somewhat 
rare, expressed significantly higher levels of satisfaction than those from the Air Force 
where promotion is commonplace (Graham, 2004). These findings are somewhat 
intuitive, especially to someone familiar with economics and the idea of diminishing 
marginal utility. But what is of special importance for economics is the idea that 
satisfaction with almost anything tends to relate inversely with its relative abundance. 
Thus, the level of income inequality may also play a role in the degree of personal well-
being and satisfaction people feel, as a function of relative income. 
The marginal utility concept is fundamental to our understanding of modem 
microeconomic theory. Some of the earliest writings on marginal analysis have set the 
stage for modem welfare economics. For instance, Jevons' theory of diminishing 
marginal utility of income posits that if interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible, 
and we assume for simplicity's sake that all individuals share a common utility function 
relating utility to income, then people with lower income will attribute a higher level of 
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utility to the marginal dollar than those with higher income. Although Jevons rejected the 
notion that interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible, the theory itself gives 
testament to some broad policy implications. Primarily, if we seek to maximize utility, 
we may do so simply by transferring money from those who are rich to those who are 
poor. To this extent, individual welfare (as measured by total utility) could only reach its 
Pareto optimum at the point where all incomes are perfectly equalized. This phenomenon 
is appropriately named the Robin Hood Effece (Landreth and Colander, 1994). 
Such drastic redistribution is clearly not on the policy agenda of most developing 
economies and social welfare is never assumed to be optimized on an aggregate level 
through income equalization. But if we assume as a narrow rule that income equality is 
associated with a greater level of aggregate welfare, then it logically follows that 
inequality must be associated with lower levels of aggregate welfare. 
In "Absolute Income, Relative Income and Happiness, " Richard Ball and 
Kateryna Chemova (2005) compare the correlation between both absolute and relative 
income on reported happiness. Their findings give empirical support to the notion that 
relative (as well as absolute) income matters a great deal in determining individual 
welfare and happiness (which I assume are generally the same thing). Taking data from 
the World Values Survey (WVS) on Purchasing Power Parity values for family incomes 
throughout a variety of countries around the world, Ball and Chemova extract data on 
absolute income levels. Absolute income as a ratio of the median income within that 
particular country is also recorded to measure relative income. The data on happiness is 
taken from a survey question that asks respondents to quantify their subjective happiness 
2 Note that the implication of the Robin Hood Effect is an abstraction from reality. When other welfare-
dependant variables are accounted for, the social welfare function will normally result in a different Pareto-
optimum allocation of resources. 
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and overall satisfaction with life on a 1 to 10 scale. Ball and Chemova find that there is a 
positive correlation between within-country income and reported happiness, statistically 
significant at a confidence level greater than 98%. Specifically, they find that as absolute 
income increases, while holding relative incomes constant (all incomes are expected to 
rise proportionally) happiness also increases, except in cases where the particular 
individual's relative income greatly exceeds the median income in their country. 
Conversely, when absolute income is held constant and relative income increases, 
happiness also increases (to the extent that the individual's absolute income is not 
excessively high). By calculating the elasticity of happiness to both relative and absolute 
income, Ball and Chemova are able to quantify the relative effects of both on happiness. 
Their findings show that for any individual with a median income, the effects of a 
marginal change in relative income on happiness are 3.84 times larger than a marginal 
change in absolute income (Ball and Chemova, 2005). These results are obtained by 
controlling for a wide array of variables that could potentially affect happiness: including 
employment status, marital status, health, age, sex, number of children, etc. This study 
gives testament to the fact that relative income has a definite effect on happiness and 
welfare, which suggests that high levels of inequality would necessarily have large effect 
on the happiness of those who are relatively poor, even if in absolute terms they are not 
poor. It also lends validity to the earlier notion of diminishing marginal utility of income, 
to the extent that Ball and Chemova found that where relative income was extremely high 
(beyond the top 1% ), the effect of the marginal dollar had little impact on happiness. The 
argument that inequality has a negative effect on happiness is convincing, yet it only 
illustrates half the story. Additionally compelling is the contention that income and asset 
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inequality can reduce economic growth and development, which, especially in the case of 
developing countries, is a paramount concern. 
A 1986 study by Irma Adelmen, on long-run changes in income distribution 
found that in noncommunist developing countries, income distribution changed for the 
worse. Over a 20-year time span, inequality measured by a Gini coefficient increased on 
average from 0.544 to 0.602. This rise in inequality was significant both between and 
within countries (especially in lower income and oil-exporting countries). Adelman 
concluded that the elimination of high levels of inequality is of great importance for the 
future of sustainable economic development, because high levels of inequality impede the 
process of long run development (Todaro, 2000). Thus, if our welfare indicator could tell 
us something not only about the level of aggregate output, but also something about the 
level and extent of inequality, we would have a better gauge for the long run prospects 
for development, prosperity and general well-being. 
Additionally convincing is the article by Christopher Niggle entitled "Equity, 
Democracy, Institutions and Growth". Niggle contends that contrary to orthodox 
neoclassical beliefs, high levels of income inequality can reduce economic growth in 
democratic nations. These contentions are based on a series of literature known as the 
"new political economy of growth", which combine ideas of median voter political 
theory with new endogenous growth theories. The effect is to show that at lower levels of 
abstraction from the Solow and Swan growth models, such that technological 
advancement and investment in human capital are determined endogenously (within the 
model), the level of income distribution will tend to relate negatively with economic 
growth (Niggle, 1998). 
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Niggle briefly discusses the empirical findings of Roland Benabou from 
"Inequality and Growth," which estimate the inequality/growth relationship in a series of 
13 studies. The studies are based on data that estimate an initial distribution of income, 
and a subsequent growth rate spanning a 20-year period. Of the thirteen, twelve find a 
definite inverse relationship. Ten studies show statistical significance and a consistent 
negative sign. These findings give testament to a somewhat egalitarian policy initiative 
(where more redistribution of income is favored), which also happens to be conducive to 
long run growth (Niggle, 1998). This being the case (that redistributive policies can 
effectively bring about growth), it is instructive that any indicator of well-being also 
reports the level of inequality, so that the appropriate fiscal and redistributive policies be 
implemented. On a more simplistic level, they also support my hypothesis that inequality 
effects growth and thus, welfare as well. 
So far, my analysis has evidenced the predominance of income inequality, as well 
as its negative impact on well-being and happiness. But the problem of asset inequality 
also has dire implications for the prospect of future growth and development, which 
relates directly to the idea ofwell-being. As the evidence suggests, large asset gaps 
seriously impede the process of economic development, as Birdsall and Londono 
effectively demonstrate in their paper entitled "Asset Inequality Matters: An Assessment 
of the World Banks approach to Poverty Reduction." For several years, many 
economists have agreed that inequality can slow the process of growth by destabilizing 
macroeconomic forces and political institutions. Inequality also generates the threat of a 
high fiscal deficit which can negatively affect capital markets and liquidity, ultimately 
reducing savings and investment, especially in the form of human capital (Birdsall and 
Londono, 1997). 
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To test the validity of this belief, Birdsall and Londono construct a regression 
measuring the relationship between inequality and economic growth, using data on 
income per capita, capital investment levels, education of the labor force, trade indicators 
and the distribution of land from 43 countries for the years 1973 to 1996. The results are 
summarized in Column 1 ofTable 1.3. The regression shows that income inequality and 
long run growth are negatively correlated with a statistical significance at the 5-percent 
level. Additionally noteworthy is that when the variables measuring inequality in 
productive assets (i.e. land, human capital and educational resource distribution) is 
incorporated into the model, initial income inequality is no longer statistically significant 
(Column 2). This suggests that raw income may be less important than access to 
fundamental economic resources. Thus, if large gaps exist in the access to such resources, 
the prospects for continued growth and development might be severely diminished. 
CHAPTER III: 
Health Resources and Safety. 
We now tum our attention to a different category of goods. We have up to this 
point examined the effects on well-being of purely market-oriented goods (or the lack 
thereof). Where real income and the level of inequality give an indication of an 
individual's ability to obtain goods like food, shelter and clothing vis-a-vis the market, 
health related goods tend to reflect the availability of substantive freedoms vis-a-vis non-
market institutions. In other words, the availability of healthcare usually depends on the 
effectiveness of the central government and its institutions in providing those provisions 
to its citizens, rather than the effectiveness of markets in distributing such goods 
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(Dasgupta, 1993). This being the case, it would logically be possible for citizens with a 
higher disposable income to suffer from a lack ofhealthcare simply because of a weak 
central government or the lack of appropriate institutions. It is for this reason that GDP 
might fail to act as a good measuring stick of variables like life expectancy, infant 
mortality and healthcare services. 
The question is: to what extent do these factors affect individual well-being? A 
study conducted by Partha Dasgupta in his book, "An Inquiry into Well-Being" suggests 
that these health related factors have the most profound effect on individual well-being. 
Dasgupta begins by selecting 48 developing countries whose 1970 real national income 
per head was less than $1,500, measured in 1980 Purchasing Power Parity U.S. dollars. 
Table 2.1 lists the data. To illustrate a clear comparison of international well-being, data 
is analyzed on six indices: including per capita income (Y), life expectancy at birth (E), 
infant mortality rate (M), adult literacy rate (L), and two indices on political (R1) and 
civil (R2) rights. The measure of well-being in this particular case is not constructed from 
a subjective measure (i.e. a survey asking how satisfied individuals are with life). Rather, 
the study relies on an ordinal measure to avoid random biases between countries. The 
Borda rule is used here as an ordinal measure, which awards each country a given score 
for each category (life expectancy, per capita income, literacy rate etc.) and then ranks 
each country by its aggregate score according to its relative performance. Table 2.1 
shows the results of this ranking as well as the results of each country in the six 
individual categories (Dasgupta, 1993). 
Using the results in Table 2.1, we can correlate each of the six well-being indices 
and the level of well-being as measured by the Borda rank. Table 2.2 summarizes these 
results, showing the Spearman correlation coefficient for each of the rankings. What is 
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revealed is that only two of the indices correlate more strongly than income with well-
being: Life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rate. Whereas the life expectancy (E) 
coefficient is 0.91, infant mortality rate (M) is 0.88 and per capita income (Y) is 0.84 
(Dasgupta, 1993). Although they all show strong correlations with well-being, the 
implication here is profound. That per capita income is less relevant to welfare than these 
two health related statistics gives a clear indication of the importance of goods that are 
not normally considered market goods. If the strength of the market does not necessarily 
give a good indication of the level of access to health related resources, then a purely 
output based measuring stick such as GDP cannot be trusted as an accurate welfare 
measure. 
Additionally important to an individual's well-being is the level of perceived 
safety and security within a given region, which acts as a corollary to the aforementioned 
health argument. In his article entitled Unhappiness and Crime: Evidence from South 
Africa, Nattavudh Powdthavee examines the relationship between perceived well-being 
and the presence of crime in regions of South Africa. His paper uses a data set taken 
from the October Household Survey (OHS) conducted by Statistics South Africa 
(StatsSA), which takes data from roughly 30,000 households on detailed socioeconomic 
and demographic information. Where the previous study used an ordinal measure for 
well-being, this study relies on a proxy measure of subjective well-being derived from a 
single question that asks households how satisfied they are with life in general. The 
answers are measured on a 1 to 5 scale: 1 being very dissatisfied and 5 being very 
satisfied. The victim of crime dummy variable (VC) is based on a survey question asking 
respondents (1) whether or not they or any members of the household have been 
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victimized by economic crime (burglary, robbery, theft etc.) and (2) whether anyone in 
the household had been murdered within the past 12 months (Powdthavee, 2005). 
The results (summarized in Table 2.3) are not particularly surprising. Correlations 
between well-being and the victim of crime variable demonstrated a significantly lower 
level of reported well-being in those households who had reported a "yes" answer to the 
victim of crime variable (about 0.08%). The victim of crime variable demonstrated the 
strongest degree of correlation with perceived well-being with a coefficient of - 0.385 and 
a robust z-statistic of -10.99. Also statistically significant were employment status, 
divorce/widow ( er) status and level of education, which correlates positively at an 
increasing rate with the level of educational improvement. For our purposes, the victim of 
crime variable is the most important (Powdthavee, 2003). 
Because the results of ordered probit regressions cannot show the marginal effects 
of one variable on another, Powthavee uses the following equation to calculate the 
"compensating expenditure variation" or the level of monetary compensation necessary 
to offset the negative psychological damage incurred by crime. 
CEV = EP ( exp {[~1-~o ]/[AinEP]} - 1) 
CEV represents the compensation expenditure variation; EP is the current 
expenditure level of each household, ~1 refers to the coefficient for the non-victimized, ~o 
refers to the coefficient for the victimized and /... is the estimated coefficient on the log 
household expenditures. The calculation suggests that in order to compensate the victim 
of crime (violent or otherwise) to the extent that they were just as well off as they would 
have been had no crime occurred the household would have to be paid (on average) a 
sum of about US$21, 142 per month. Considering that the average household spends 
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about US$240 per month, this would amount to a compensation package equal to the 
value of 82 times their monthly expenditure to negate the ill-effects of crime on their 
well-being (Powdthavee, 1993). One obvious problem with this calculation, however, is 
that it only applies to households and not individuals. It also does not account for the 
amount of times (above one) a single household unit has been victimized in a given year. 
Adding these two variables to the model would likely produce different results. 
The implication here is self evident. If the psychological effect of a criminal act is 
as damaging as the reduction in expenditures by a multiple of 82, we must conclude that 
the effects of income on subjective well-being are relatively weak. Thus, if we are 
attempting to equate income with well-being, without accounting for the more relevant 
factors such as health, life expectancy and relative safety, we will not arrive at an 
accurate conclusion. 
CHAPTER IV: 
Some Alternative Welfare Measures 
Considering our argument that GDP fails to render an accurate portrayal of the 
state of human welfare on an international scale, we now tum our attention to several 
alternative indices that attempt to give a clearer, more comprehensive snapshot of cross-
national welfare. The Levy Institute of Bard College has produced a measure of 
economic well-being that is of particular interest here because of its unique focus on 
income distribution. The Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being (LIMEW) is a 
more comprehensive measure of the extent to which households have access to the goods 
and services produced within a modem market economy. The measure is constructed by 
25 
taking money income (MI) minus property income and government transfer payments, 
which results in "base money income". Employer contributions to health insurance, 
income from accumulated wealth, net government expenditures and household 
production (domestic outputs) are then added to the base money income. Table 2.0a 
shows the breakdown of the components of LIMEW and EI (Extended Income: a more 
comprehensive measure than Money Income but less comprehensive than LIMEW) 
(Wolfe, Zacharias & Asena, 2004). 
The extraordinary element of the LIMEW (and MI and EI) is its use of a Gini 
coefficient to measure inequality. Table 2.0b shows the levels of inequality as measured 
by LIMEW, EI, MI, PFI (LIMEW less the value of household production) and LIMEW-
C (LIMEW less the value of household production and public consumption). The table 
shows that inequality levels are higher when measured by LIMEW -C than the official 
measures MI and EI. Because LIMEW -C eliminates household production and public 
consumption, we can assume that household production and public consumption are more 
equally distributed (Wolfe, Zacharias & Asena, 2004). This implication suggests that for 
developing countries, in which household production is a large portion of total output, 
inequality may be somewhat lower that the reported numbers suggest. 
The problem with these measures discussed by the Levy Institute is that they 
currently only apply to the United States. They are not cross-national welfare indicators, 
and no data exists with which to construct this index for developing nations. 
Additionally, many developing nations would be extremely hard-pressed to produce 
figures for things like property income, employer contributions for health insurance, 
payroll taxes, annuity from non-home wealth and other components of the LIMEW 
measure. A third problem lies in the fact that the LIMEW measures something slightly 
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different from the majority of other welfare measures. While the majority of international 
welfare measures focus on a broad definition of human welfare, the LIMEW focuses very 
narrowly on individuals "command" (or purchasing power) over goods and services, and 
therefore renders a much less comprehensive result. The remainder of this chapter will 
therefore focus on three major cross-national measurements of welfare, which encompass 
a large variety of factors. 
Andrew Sharpe's Survey of Economic Indicators prepared for the Canadian 
Policy Research Networks (CPRN) divides the various measures into three distinct 
categories: time series indexes of well-being for Canada, provincial and community 
indexes for Canada, and cross-national indexes ofwell-being. Because the focus of this 
paper is largely on the disparities in well-being between developing countries, my 
analysis of indicators will only focus on the latter category. These measures are: the 
Human Development Index (HDI) created by the UN development program; the Quality 
of Life Index (QOL) developed at the University of Illinois by Ed Diener and the Index 
of Social Progress (ISP) developed at the University of Pennsylvania by Richard Estes. 
The intention here is to shed some light on how the measurements vary, how they 
connect to growth and development, and to what extent they take into consideration the 
various factors I consider to be relevant to well-being. It will also be necessary to 
examine the degree to which each of these measures demonstrates a positive correlation 
with GDP, which would suggest some degree of redundancy. 
The most talked about alternative to GDP is the Human Development Index. 
Devised by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1990, the HDI is the 
most widely used index in measuring cross-national performance in economic and social 
development. The HDI is composed of the main indicators of well-being: the quality of 
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health (measured by life expectancy at birth), educational resources (measured by the 
adult literacy rate [2/3 weight] and level of school enrollment [1/3 weight]; and income 
per capita [measured in PPP dollars]). This method rejects the traditional notion that 
human welfare is proportional to the level of gross economic activity. Rather, it uses 
logarithmic indices to incorporate data on health and longevity, with literacy and 
education as well as an output-based income index. Therefore there is a need for giving a 
more comprehensive view of aggregate well-being, by taking a more humanistic 
approach in calculation (Miles and Scott, 2000, pp. 29-30). 
In addition to the standard HDI, the UNDP has also created a corollary 
measurement called the Human Poverty Index (HPI), specifically catered to developing 
countries. This index concentrates on the same three major variables of health, education 
and standard of living, but the method of measurement is different. The health 
measurement is taken by the proportion of the population not expected to live to age 40. 
The education criteria is measured by the proportion of the population who are illiterate, 
and the standard of living criteria is estimated in distinct ways; the proportion of the 
population that does not have access to clean water resources, the proportion of 
underweight children and the proportion of individuals who do not have access to 
healthcare services (Sharpe, 1999). 
If the validity of the HDI/HPI as a measure of well-being is judged according to 
its incorporation of income disparities and the availability of health related services, then 
HDIIHPI index does fairly well. The indexes within the HPI relating to access to health 
services, clean water and underweight children would invariably incorporate the degree 
of income disparity. Although no direct measure of inequality (like a Gini coefficient) is 
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present, these three variables do give a clear indication of whether or not a country is 
plagued by severe inequality. 
The weakness ofHDI, however, is that it lacks breadth. It focuses narrowly on 
health, income and educational attainment, which some would argue fails to incorporate 
additionally important factors such as civil and political rights, environmental 
sustainability and female participation in the workforce. Yet the most pervasive argument 
against the HDI is its redundancy to the GDP measure. In the article "Is the Human 
Development Index Redundant? " Miles B Cahill argues that, to a large extent, the 
information provided by HDI is redundant as a stand-in for GDP. He bases this judgment 
on criteria provided by McGillivray and White (1993), who propose a rule of thumb that 
any variable can be considered redundant if the correlation coefficient is above 0.90 for a 
"level one redundancy" and 0.70 for a "level two redundancy". Using the Pearson zero-
order and Spearman rank-order correlation matrices, Cahill finds that the HDI correlates 
with GDP with a coefficient of 0.928 at a 99.9% level of significance using the Pearson 
matrix, and with a coefficient of 0.942, also at a 99.9% level of significance using the 
Spearman matrix; suggesting an explicitly high level of redundancy. 
My own analysis of the HDI measurement also reveals a significant redundancy 
with GDP, which I will discuss in greater detail shortly. This being the case, it would be 
superfluous to calculate HDI in addition to GDP because they would essentially tell us 
the same thing about the state of human welfare, and given the shortsightedness of GDP 
in measuring welfare, the HDI measure would be of little additional help. Thus, it may be 
necessary to analyze some additional indexes that examine a more comprehensive and 
differentiated set of welfare relevant variables. 
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A second alternative to GDP is the Basic Index of the Quality ofLife (Basic 
QOL), developed by Ed Diener in 1995 at the University oflllinois Urbana-Champaign. 
This measure incorporates a "universal set of values" to determine how the quality of life 
differs across nations. The Basic QOL includes seven welfare relevant variables: 
including purchasing power, homicide rate, suicide rate, adult literacy, fulfillment of 
basic needs, human rights violations and deforestation. The set of "universal values" is 
based on sociological research that derives the aforementioned variables from an 
extensive list of 45 values consistent across countries. These values can be broadly 
classified under three major categories reflecting the most fundamental needs of human 
existence: the coordination of social interaction between individuals and groups, basic 
biological needs, survival and welfare requirements (Sharpe, 1999). The difficulty in 
relying on the Basic QOL, however, is that there is no definitive weighting system for 
each of the several variables. The data in Table 3.2 gives Diener's proposed weighting 
scheme for the QOL measure as of2003. 
The last of the three cross-national measures is the Index of Social Progress (ISP), 
developed by Richard Estes in 1997 at the University ofPennsylvania. The index was 
created for the purpose of identifying changes in "the adequacy of social provision" and 
"assessing the progress of developing nations in meeting the standard of social and 
material needs". The index is made up of 46 indicators (listed in Table 3.1 ), which can be 
classified in ten general sub-indexes: health status, education, defense effort, economic 
prowess, demography, woman's status, geography, political participation, cultural 
diversity and welfare effort. The weighting system used in this index is derived from a 
two-part varimax factor analysis, which analyzes each sub-index to find the extent to 
which it contributes to changes over time in social and economic progress. Each sub-
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index is then designated with a score based on its relative effectiveness in promoting 
development. Scores are then multiplied by the factor loadings to give weighted sub-
indexes, which are compiled together in the Composite Weighted Index of Social 
Progress (WISP) (Sharpe, 1999). 
The strength of this particular index lies both in its comprehensive repertoire of 
sub-indexes and in its effective weighting system. It eliminates those variables that have 
not contributed to social development and the advancement of well-being. It clearly 
accounts for income disparities through its composite human suffering index and all five 
welfare effort sub-indexes (listed in Table 3.1), as well as health related variables through 
the seven health status sub-indexes (also in Table 3.1). Table 3.2 summarizes the various 
attributes and weighting systems of the three major indicators (note that HDI and HPI are 
shown in the chart as two separate indicators). 
All three indexes demonstrate an obvious positive correlation with GDP 
(wealthier countries tend to score better in all three measurements), as illustrated in Table 
3.3. This relationship is intuitive; any accurate measure of human welfare should 
demonstrate some degree of colinearity with income. The danger, however, as Cahill 
argues, is that the measure will correlate so strongly with income that it will offset the 
benefit of individuality. Each measure should show something significant and relevant, 
but also something keenly unique. If an index fails to show any unique attributes it is 
essentially worthless. It is for this reason that I have constructed a correlation matrix for 
all the relevant indexes to determine their levels of uniqueness from GDP, as well as to 
show their correlation with inequality (measured as a Gini coefficient) and the general 
quality of health (as measured by average life expectancy). The results are surprising and 
have significant implications for the method of comparing cross-national welfare. 
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First, I have found evidence similar (although less robust) to Cahill's study. From 
a data set of 177 countries taken from the Human Development Report 2005, the results 
suggest a fairly significant level of redundancy (Table 3.3 and 3.4 show the R-Square 
coefficients). We find that the correlation coefficient for HDI is 0.80, which, although 
lower than Cahill's 0.94 correlation coefficient, is still highly significant and would 
clearly suggest a large degree of redundancy. Only about 20% (1 - .08) of what HDI 
measures is different from that of what GDP measures. Although these results are not as 
profound as Cahill's, they tend to support a similar argument that HDI shows little more 
than the traditional GDP measure. The only real optimistic observation of the HDI 
measure is the fact that it is the strongest indicator of life expectancy. With a correlation 
coefficient of0.87, it has a significantly higher correlation with life expectancy that any 
other measure. This could, however, be attributed to the fact that the HDI directly 
accounts for life expectancy with a 33.3% weight (Table 3.2). Nonetheless, it still may be 
the best indicator of the quality of health in any given country. 
The other two measures tell a different story. The correlation coefficients for 
WISP and QOL (when measured against GDP) are 0.59 and 0.82 respectively. While the 
WISP measure demonstrates a clearly lower degree of redundancy, the QOL is 
shockingly high (about the same as HDI). The implication here is that 41% (1 - 0.059) of 
what the WISP measures is being affected by something other than income. Given this 
level of independence, we must conclude that the WISP measure is capable of telling us 
something about the state ofhuman welfare that GDP cannot. Additionally interesting is 
the fact that the WISP measure also demonstrates the strongest negative correlation with 
inequality, with a correlation coefficient of - 0.556. This would imply that the WISP 
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measure, although it has no intrinsic mechanism for incorporating inequality into its 
score, is the best indicator of economic equity as well. 
Conclusion 
I have endeavored to show over the course of the paper that the traditional GDP 
aggregate is inconsequential as a welfare measurement. The horizons of traditional 
economics have begun to broaden over the past few decades, and we now live in a world 
where estimates on output no longer suffice as a measurement of the living standard. The 
GDP measure is too narrowly defined to capture all the requisite details that make a 
person satisfied with life. 
It is truly difficult to say with any certainty what it is that makes a person well-
off. But I have established a few of those most essential aspects, without which no decent 
standard of living would be possible. First, the level of inequality not only affects welfare 
and the standard of living, but it is also completely neglected by GDP. Secondly, the 
general quality of health (as determined by life expectancy at birth as well as safety from 
violent crime) has been shown to correlate most definitively with welfare 
approximations. If we are to derive a numerical estimate of well-being, it must therefore 
incorporate these variables first and foremost. 
In our analysis of the alternative measures of welfare, it was determined that the 
HDI index successfully incorporates those most critical features of welfare into its 
calculation, especially the quality of health as measured by the life expectancy variable. 
Yet its redundancy with GDP would suggest that it is somewhat irrelevant. The QOL 
offered a more robust set of variables, but it, too, demonstrated a high level of 
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redundancy with GDP (more so than the HDI measure), which may be reason enough to 
reject it as an appropriate measure ofwell-being. Our last measure, however, was a 
different story. The greatest strength of the (Weighted) Index of Social Progress ((W)ISP) 
lies in its equally (if not more) robust and comprehensive set of variables, as well as its 
prescribed weighting system that delegates the greatest weight to the most welfare 
relevant variable in any given country. It also demonstrates the least amount of 
redundancy with the GDP measure, and exhibits the strongest negative correlation with 
inequality. I therefore conclude that given the criteria, the ISP measure gives a more 
comprehensive and accurate portrayal of cross-national well-being, and should therefore 
be regarded with equal, if not greater, esteem than HDI, QOL and dare I say, GDP as 
well. 
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Tables and References 
Table 1: 
Some Income Distribution Estimates in Developing Countries 
Quintile 
llighest 
Country 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 10% Year 
Bangladesh 9.4 13.5 17.2 22.0 37.9 23.7 1992 
Botswana 3Jj 6.9 11.4 19.2 58.9 42.9 1986 
Brazil 2.5 5.7 9.9 17.7 64.2 47.9 1995 
Colombia 3. 1 6.8 10.9 17.6 61.5 46.9 1995 
Costa Rica 4.0 fl.8 13.7 21.7 51.8 34.7 1996 
Ghana 7.9 12.0 16.1 21.8 42.2 27.3 1992 
Guatemala 2.1 5.8 10.5 Hl.6 63.0 46.6 1989 
Honduras 3.4 7.1 I 1.7 19.7 58.0 42. 1 1996 
India 9.2 13.0 16.fl 21.7 39.3 25.0 1994 
Jamaica 5.8 10.2 14.9 21 .6 47.5 3 1.9 1991 
Pakistan 8.4 12.9 16.9 22.2 39.7 25.2 1991 
Peru 4 .~) 9.2 14.1 21.'1 50.4 34.3 1994 
Philippines 5.9 9.6 13.9 21.1 49.6 33.5 1994 
South i\f rica 3.3 5.8 9.8 17.7 633 47.3 1993 
Zambia 3.9 8.0 13.8 23.8 50.4 3 1.3 1993 
Averages 5.2 8.5 13.7 20.8 5 1.8 36.0 
Sourn~: \Vorld Uank. I.'J!JH \·Vorld I JPIPIOfllll{'llt ltuUrawrs (\Va'ihin~IUII , IJ.L .. \Vorld Bank, I !l!lU). Ia h. 2.R. 
Table 1.2: 
Income and Inequality in Developing Countries 1996 
Income Share of Hatio of 
GNI' Per Capita, Lowest 40% Highest 20% Gini 
Country 1996 (U.S. $) of Households to Lowest 20% Coefficient 
Bangladesh 260 22.9 4.0 0.213 
Kenya 320 10.1 18.3 0.58 
Sri Lanka 740 22.0 4.4 0.30 
Indonesia 1.0130 20.4 5.1 0.34 
Philippines I,IGO 15.5 8.4 0.4:! 
Jamaica 1,600 16.0 13.2 0.4 1 
Paraguay 1,850 !1.2 27.1 0.59 
Costa Rica 2.640 12.8 12.9 0.4 7 
Malaysia 4,370 12.9 11.7 0.4B 
Brazil 4,400 !1.2 25.7 0.60 
Source: World Hnnk, World Deuelotmumtlwlicnlllrs. 19.'111 (Washingtun , D.C.. : World flank . I !l!JA). tabs. 1. 1 uml 2.!1. 
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Table 1.3 
A. f)cp/aining Aggl't!gatt Growth 
lndependenl vari:.blc (I) (2) {3) 
Constant 0.01 0.()4•• 0.03 
Aggreg31e growth 
Capital accumulation 0 . .53° 0 0 . .57° 0 O.s.t•• 
Initial conditions: 
Income level - 0.88 - 0.41 -0.42 
Education level 0.17 0.211" 0.30• 
locomr. in~OJ~Iity -oo~· -003 - 000? 
Land inequality - 0.02" - 0.01 
Educarional 
inequality - 0 .09• -0.09• 
Natural resources - 0.01 
Changes in: 
Income inequality 
Trade openness 0.02 
Manufa•:turing 
trade 
Primary trade 
LAC dummy 0.0()4 
R, 0.61 0.70 0.76 
B. Explaining l~teomt' Growth of tht' Poo,....fl 
Independent variable (4) (5 ) (6) 
ConstMt 0.00 0.0.5' 0.()4' 
AII&R'glllc growth .. ~ , .. 
Capital accumulation o.n•• 0.77 .. 
Initial condition: 
lncOI'IIC level 
Education level 0.41 ' O.SI' 
Income int'quality o.os 0.02 
Land inequality -0.07• -0.02 
Educational 
ilk>quality - 0.200 - 0 .18• 
Nalural resources 
Changes in: 
Income inequality - 0 .27 .. 
Trade open~"s 
Manufacturing 
trade 0.05' 
Primary trade - 0 .01 
LAC dummy - 0.01 
R' 0.51 0.42 0 .63 
' Slalistically significant at the tO-percent level. 
• Statistically significant at the .5 -percent level. 
•• Statistic&lly significant at the I ·percent level. 
Source: Tables 3.1-3.3 from Todaro, 1999 
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Table 2.0 a 
A Comparison Between LIMEW and EI 
.-------------------------------------~----------------------------------- -----
LIMEW 
,\Ioney inwnh.' ( .\-11 ) 
[c:<.': Proper!}' incomt' anJ p.uvt.~rnm~o·nt c<~sh trallsfcr,.., 
Ettlw!f.: Rase money illCl\IHt' 
P/w:: In -kind ~ompt•n:..llion from work 
Emplorcr Ltmlrihutinn . .; li1r he.1lth insllf;lnLt: 
l:"tJIItils: Base in(Oilh! 
f.c.~s: ' lilXCS 
Income t;n;c!' 1 
P.,yroll taxes ' 
Propl.'rtr taxc:.' 
Consumption t.1xc~ 
Plm-: lncom~o· from Wl'alth 
Annuity from nonhum~o.• Wl'<llth 
Impuh:·c.l rt:nt ;Jl cost uf own~.·r-occupicd hou)>in~ 
rlrts: C.1sh 1 ran!>t"ers' 
Pllll>': l':tuK,J~h lran:-fer:- 1' 1 
Plu:o.-: Puhlic t,:onsumptinn 
f'/11~ Hnuschnld prndlJ(tion 
hp~t~ls: I.!~ IE\\' 
El 
;\lone~· i JKI)Ilh.' O.lf ) 
I.e.'.•: l)ropaty incnmt.· "'"I !!nwrnment (.:l!oh transfer:-. 
/i,Juak Uasc money income 
P/11$: In-kind compensation frnm work 
Employer cnntrihutiOil" li)r lu .. ·;dth iiNif.llll:~ 
I:'Jf!lll'-': IJ~tS.C incnmc 
Lt'$;>: 'IJxcs 
I nt:omc tax1.•s 
Parroll lax1.·s 
Propert}' laXI.'~ 
fl/u,•: llKnnH .. ' from wealth 
Pro~)i'rty im:nmt· .md reali :t:ed c;tpit<tl ~<lim• Oos!.I.'Sl 
Imputed rdurn on hl)lllt' equit~· 
/)/us: Cash trans!Cr~ 
fJ/u.c: .\oncash transfers 
I. The <tmounts cstimo.lted b~' the C~.·mus Bureau and lJ.'o(.'d in El are mc)(liticd to make the aggrcg;.th."':' I.'Onsistt.•nt with the ;\IPA ('stim;.tU:s. 
_j 
~- Tht:" govemmt."n t-..:o)t appruc1dt i) U)t,:d: th~.· C.:nsus l3un:au u.'cs th1.• fungihlc \'aluc method for va luing ~ ·h.·diL"are ;md \-lt"dicaid in El. Tl11.• Ill..! ill difti.:-r~.·nr:.: hctw~.·cn 
tht' two methods is th o1 1. while tht' fun~ibl .. • v;,tlur method .t)oosi~ns an in,omc \\Jiue for n bt•ncfit ;\llording to the rt·cipi""· n t '~ kwl of incunh .. ', th.,·)!munl11l'l11 -cn.,t 
Jp)'rtl.Kh JS)ooiKns .ut inn.mw \'a lut' fnr a bt>ndit irre~peL: tiVI.' of th~,· l'l.'l.'ipiL'III\ inwmt•. 
Table 2.0b 
Economic Inequality by Income Measure, U.S. 1989 to 2001 
60 
30 
8 40 
E 
" ·a
.10 != 
"§ 
c 
20 
~ 
10 
0 
··-···---·-··----· 
1989 38.9 3(1.9 41.1! 
illl 1995 3X.6 4:1.3 -10.5 39.2 ·1·1.\1 
• 2000 42.5 41l.Y 45.0 40.1\ •16.0 
• 200 1 ·10.'1 46.3 42.9 '11. 1 45.5 
Note: For deli nil io ns, sec Table I and nolcs 10 Tabk 2. 
Sourt"r: Authors' (~lku lations 
Source: Tables 4.0 a & b from the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being 
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Table 2.1 
Ran kings of living standards data of 48 of the world's poorest cou ntries. 
1980 
Rorda y F. M L Rl R:_ 
Rank 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mali 7 7 
Ethiopia 2 3 7 6 4 
Niger 3 II 3 7 8 
Chad 4 5 3 ~ 4 8 12 
Yemen 5 30 5 4 10 
Malawi 6 10 7 3 13 ~ 12 
Sierra Leone 7 14 I 2 4 21 12 
Burunui R 4 14 20 13 8 
Somalia 9 9 7 II 32 
CAR 10 12 17 12 20 
Mauritania II 18 6 14 8 8 12 
Renin 12 15 17 21 17 I I 
Uganda 13 2 14 n 21J I 
Nepal 14 13 13 13 9 8 24 
Haiti 15 25 28 17 II ~ 
za·ire 15 1 21 28 31 8 I 
Rwanda 17 8 11 19 n 21 12 
Tanzania IS 5 23 24 42 8 12 
Pakistan 19 31 21 21 12 21 12 
Gambia 20 17 2 5 4 47 45 
Sudan 21 21 14 23 19 21 24 
Madagascar 22 19 26 10 27 21 24 
Senegal ?~ 
-·' 
27 II 8 I 39 41 
Bangladesh 23 16 19 15 lo 34 41 
Liberia 25 23 28 33 13 34 12 
Swaziland 26 35 27 16 37 8 24 
Zambia 27 26 25 35 24 21 24 
Nigeria 28 28 19 25 21 39 24 
Ken ya 29 ?.2 33 37 26 21 24 
Lesotho 30 24 28 26 29 34 24 
Egypt 31 32 37 29 24 21 24 
Indonesia 32 33 31 31 34 21 24 
Bolivia 33 40 23 18 36 39 24 
Tunisia 34 44 39 34 34 8 24 
Zimbabwe 34 29 33 38 38 21 24 
Jordan 36 45 41 41 40 8 12 
India 37 20 32 30 23 39 45 
IIonuuras 38 34 38 36 32 39 12 
China 39 42 46 46 38 8 12 
Morocco 40 36 36 32 17 34 44 
Philippines 41 41 40 42 41 21 24 
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Bonia ) ' E 
R;u1k 
(I ) (2) (:') 
Boh.wana ~2 ~ 3J 
Th~til;md 4,1 .t"' ~I 
Para~uay JJ J(l 45 
.'outh Korea 45 .17 .to 
Ec:u;~dur ..J6 ..JX 4.' 
Sri Lanka .n _,6 JX 
:\tmui tiu~ ..j~ .W J4 
Key: 
Bnrda Rank : r;ulking u!\in!). 13t1Bia Rule: 
)·': per capita income ( 19 'II ptm.:h•" inl! pm~cr p;nit}) 
F: hk t'Xf'lCCI;Jn(·y at bi rt h (years) 
,\1: infanl mortality r;.1t1.: (l);.; r IOCIO) 
/ . : ;tdult l i tl"r;ll' ~· r<~l\.' (':") 
f( 1: index nt political right:-
R~: index of ci\·il rip,ht<; 
Table 2.2 
M I , Rl R~ 
(4) (5) (()) (7) 
.\9 n :19 J:l 
4,:\ -l7 .\4 12 
44 -W ::!1 24 
.+: ~- _, 1J 
40 ..J~ .W ~4 
47 45 Y·J J5 
.t5 .1) 47 41 
Table 5.3 Correlation matrix of constituent rankings of well-being 
Borda y E A'/ L 
y O.K407 
E 0.9133 0.7895 
M 0.8797 0.6943 0.9180 
L 0. 7597 0.5942 0.8018 0.7934 
R1 0.6842 0.4916 0.4105 0.4065 0.2420 
R2 0.6881 0.5 135 0.4147 0.3841 0.2654 
Note: All correlations arc statistically significant at a Y% level. 
Source: Tables 4.1 and 4.2 from Dasgupta 1993, (pg. 112-115) 
39 
N.l 
0.7871 
Table 2.3 
Perceived Quality of Life Regression with Victim-of-Crime Variable for 
South Africa, 1997 (Ordered Probit Results). 
Victim of crime ( = I) 
(A) Household characteristics 
Ln (Household expenditure) 
Household size 
Urban ( = I) 
Home ownership ( = I) 
Phone in dwelling ( = I) 
( B) Main respondent ·s characteristics 
Race: coloured 
Race: Indian 
Race: white 
Male ( = I) 
Unempl.; looking for work 
Unempl. ; not looking for work 
Working part-time 
Housewife/students 
Retired 
Disabled 
Education: standard level 1- 3 
Education: standard level 4-6 
Education: standard level 7- 9 
Education: standard level I 0 and higher 
Age 
Age2j !OO 
Married: civil law 
Married ; traditional law (custom) 
Living together with partner 
Widower/widow 
Divorced/separated 
Province dummies (9) 
Relation to head of household (9) 
N 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R1 
Coefficient 
- 0.358 
0.08 1 
- 0.017 
- 0.071 
0.030 
0.163 
0.284 
0.082 
0.054 
-0.050 
- 0. 124 
-0.089 
- 0. 127 
- 0.048 
0.023 
-0.095 
- 0.013 
0.063 
0.094' 
0.160 
- 0.011 
0.011 
0.122 
0.003 
- 0.007 
- 0.074 
- 0.100 
Yes 
Yes 
20.634 
- 26491.058 
0.0345 
z-statistic 
( - 10.99) . 
(6.24) 
( - 4.30) 
(- 2. 17) 
( 1.00) 
(5.83) 
(4.84) 
( 1.27) 
( 1.22) 
( - 2.13) 
(- 5.13) 
( - 1.41) 
( - 2.79) 
( - 2. 12) 
(0.55) 
( - 1.02) 
( - 0.26) 
( 1.90) 
(3 .05) 
(4.67) 
(- 2.38) 
(2.03) 
(3.29) 
(0.09) 
( - 0 .16) 
( - 1.67) 
( - 1.75) 
"Reference variables are: black (race), working full-time (employment status). no education 
(education level). never married (marital status). Other controls include unemployment rate 
measured at the magistrate district level. the ratios of other male members in the household, and the 
education levels and employment status of household members other than the main respondents. 
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Table 3.1: 
Index of Social Progress, Indicators by Subindex 
I. ft:Dl.iCATIONAL St.lBINDEX (~=6) 
Pcre><.;m Age Group Enrolled. Primllry Level(+) 
Pero.:~nt Grad~: l Enmllmr.:nt Cm~lpkting f>( Htary s~,.:hmJl (+) 
Percent Age Group Enrolled. Secondary U:.,.d {•) 
Percent Age Group Enrolled. Tertiary Lc.vc. ( +) 
Percent Adu l: Illiteracy(-) 
Percent GNP in Education (+) 
II. HEALTH STATLS SI.'BII\UEX (1\:7) 
LifL: E., ~'Celation <H l Y t:ar ( +) 
Rate Infant \1ortality pe.r ! ,OUU Livebo rn ( ·t 
Under 5 Yl·ars uf Ag~: Child \1ortality lbt~: ( } 
Popuiation in Thou:\u~ds rx;r Physician (<t 
Pc.r Ctpita Daily Caluric Supply~~ '::.r. of Re~.tum::n ~L'nt (+) 
Pc:-ccnt C!1ildm1 fu ly Inu:JUn.izcd at Age I. DPT 1.+) 
Pcro.:cnt Ci1illin:n FOJ.I::'r Immuniz,·J ~ll Age I. \ka~lr.:. s (~ ) 
Ill. \\'0;\lE~ STATl JS S{jHI:\DEX {:\=6l 
female Li t'~:. E.\pectalioo m Birth (+) 
h:ma:o.: Adult Lite rae)' Rate ( + } 
Percent ~-la:-r ied \Vumcn Usin![ Cn ntrac.cptio n (+) 
\·tatcr r~ <1l Mortality Ra1c per 10.000 Live Binh~ ( } 
Fe mall'. Primary School Enro.lmcm as Percent or Male:. ( +} 
Female Se-condary School Emo.lmcnt as Pcrcem of J'\hlcs (+I 
I\'. DEFE!\'SE EFFO~T st;BINI>EX (1\=1) 
\Eiitilf)' E.\pcnJiturc~ as 1\:rccn tlJf UDP ( ) 
V. ECO:"'lO\IIC StHI!\DEX (N=6l 
P~:r Capita G:u~!> 1\';ttional ProJu-.:t in Dollnr), ( +} 
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( 
Real Gro.~s Domestic Product per Head(+) 
GNP per Capita Annual Growth Rate(+) 
Average. Annual Rate of Inflation ( · ) 
Per CLlpita Food Pr<XIuction [ndcx ( +) 
External Public Debt as Percent of GDP ( } 
ToH~l Popu!atlon \1Hl!ons ( · ) 
Crude Birth Ra~e per I DOO Popu'at!on (.) 
R•.ne of PopulatioP- Incre-ase ( ~) 
P~rcc.nt of Population uc~dcr 15 Y~:ars (-) 
P· .. ~n:cnt of Popul•ttion over 60 'YI..'ars (- ) 
VII. ftEOGR.\I,IIY Sl!BlNDEX (:\:3) 
Percent Amb:c Land :vt~s ( +) 
.:-.:i.Hural Di~~.t~ttr Vu'nl'mbllit)· lnLh:: ., ( } 
:\vcrag~: Ann uaiD-ei.Uhs from i\'atura!Oisa~~er~ per .\1L lion Popula~ilm (-) 
VIII. POLITICAL PARTICU•ATJOl\ SUBI~DEX fN=3) 
Vit):at !on~ t) ·Political Rights lndc.\ ( } 
Vil)-al iom, ni' Civil Uberties H nde.~ (.) 
Comp\:)~ite Hum•1n .Suffering [ndcx ( ) 
IX. ClH.Tl.!RAL HIVERSITY Sl.iBil'\DEX (N=5) 
Largc~t }>(:n;c.nt Sharing Same Mo ther To ngue(+) 
Largest Percem Sharing Same Bask Rei' giou~ Bdicfs. ( +) 
Large~t P~rcem Sht.trir:g S•~me o r Similar RadaliEtr:nic Or igins( +) 
X. WJ·:.LFARE I~FHlRT Sl.iHISl)f:X (~=5) 
Year~ Since First La\\' - Old A_gc, lrnalidii~. OeiH.h (+) 
Yei.t.l~ Si n._:~: first LH.o. ·· Sicknc.~~ and ~•latcmi;y (+) 
Yeaf :s Sir ~cc firsl Las~; "" \Vof..< Injury ( +) 
Year:-. Sinct: first Law llnemp loyn;cm (+) 
Yctu~ Sin._:~: Firs! L1w - Fam.il_:.· Alkm•wcc:-. (+) 
Taken from Sharpe, 1999 
( 
Table 3.2 
Attributes and Respective Weights of the Given Indexes 
(The numbers indicate the percentage weight that the particular measure gives to the variable in 
the corresponding column and an X indicates that the measure has no fixed weighting system) 
Life Expectancy Adult Output/ material Access to Access to Health 
at Birth Literacy wellbeing Clear Water Services 
HDI 0.33 0.33 0.33 
HPI 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.11 
QOL 0.188 0.19 
ISP X X X X 
Proportion of Fulfillment 
Underweight Job of Physical 
Children Security Homicide Rate Needs Suicide Rate 
HDI 
HPI 0.11 
QOL 0.077 
ISP 
Military 
Quality of Family Defense Demographic/Populatio 
Human Rights Relations Women's Status Effort n Sustainability 
HDI 0.143 
HPI 
QOL 0.113 0.047 0.61 
ISP X X X X 
Political 
Participation/ 
Environmental Cultural Degree of Welfare Economic 
Sustainability Diversity Democracy State Sustainability 
HDI 
HPI 
QOL 0.61 0.262 
ISP X X X X X 
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Table 3.3 
Table 3.4 
Correlation Matrix of Significant Variables 
GDP 
er head 
0.5876061 
0.8172755 
-0.499468 
0.8078838 
WISP GINI 
0.660845 
-0.556564 -0.470328 
0.8303789 0.8343953 -0.54024 
HDI 
0.6384416 0.7070003 0.7724032 -0.48742 0.8699682 
Effectiveness of Various Indicators in Accounting for health ; 
inequality 
GIN I LIFE EXP. 
Variables 
44 
GOP 
• HOI 
o QOL 
o WISP 
Life 
( 
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Appendix A. 3 
!coUNTRY !YEAR icJDP Qer head !wisP OOL !Hoi ~ife Ex12ectancy laini 
Albania 1995 5260 59 5.63 0.78 73.8 50 
Algeria 1995 5770 54.3 5.571 0.722 71.1 35.4 
Argentina 1995 13350 67.9 6.469 0.863 74.5 47.4 
Armenia 1995 3993 67.5 5.42 0.759 71.5 38.1 
Australia 1995 31010 82.6 7.9 0.955 80.3 30.2 
Austria 1995 31420 93.2 7.268 0.936 79 271 
Azerbaijan 1995 4628 52.1 5.37 0.729 66.9 45.9 
Bahrain 1995 17670 49.6 6.03 0.846 74.3 50 
Bangladesh 1995 1660 29.7 5.646 0.52 62.8 50 
Belarus 1995 7200 67.6 4.978 0.786 68.1 25.3 
Belgium 1995 30660 86.8 7.095 0.945 78.9 29.8 
Bolivia 1995 3680 42.4 5.49 0.687 64.1 52.7, 
Botswana 1995 10400 44.3 4.81 0.565 74.2 50 
Brazil 1995 8760 60 6.47, 0.792 70.5 53.6 
Bulgaria 1995 8664 82 6.162 0.808 72.2 28 
Canada 1995 34150 77.8 7.59 0.949 80 28.8 
Chile 1995 12120 76.7 6.789 0.854 77.9 54.5 
China 1995 6270 37.7 6.08~ 0.755 71.6 18.5 Columbia 1995 7330 62.6 6.17 0.785 72.4 56.6 
Costa Rica 1995 9000 72.1 6.62 0.838 78.2 42.9 
Croatia 1995 11870 68.7 6.301 0.841 75 50 
Cyprus 1995 20500 74.8 7.09h 0.891 78.6 50 
Czech Republic 1995 17600 84.4 6.69 0.874 75.6 21.6 
Denmark 1995 32490 98.4 7.79 0.941 77.2 20 
Dominican Republic 1995 6610 53.8 5.63 0.749 67.2 51.6 
Ecuador 1995 4030 56.7 6.27 0.759 74.3 43.7 
Egypt 1995 3930 49.2 5.605 0.659 69.8 28.7, 
El Salvador 1995 3780 55.5 6.1 0.722 70.9 44.1 
Estonia 1995 14800 79.8 5.905 0.853 71.3 31 
Finland 1995 29650 90.8 7.618 0.941 78.5 21.7, 
France 1995 30640 91.9 7.08 0.938 79.5 30.2 
Georgia 1995 3841 55.3 5.365 0.732 70.5 50 
Germany 1995 28250 88.1 7.048 0.93 78.7 27.8 
Ghana 1995 2560 24.8 5.17 0.52 56.8 50 
Greece 1995 22340 82.1 7.163 0.912 78.3 35.1 
Guatemala 1995 4050 33.7 5.321 0.663 67.3 50 
Haiti 1995 1470 22.8 4. 0.475 51.6 50 
Honduras 1995 2740 53.1 5.2 0.667 67.8 52.2 
Hong Kong 1995 31660 77.7 7.341 0.916 81.6 50 
Hungary 1995 16047 87.2 6.53 0.862 72.7 24.2 
3 Data compiled by author from the HDI world Development Report 1995 and 
supplementary data provided by Ed Diener at the University of Illinois. 
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Iceland 1995 33560 87.5 0.956 80.7 50 
Indonesia 1995 3840 43.3 0.697 66.8 50 
Iran 1995 7630 45.5 0.736 70.4 50 
Ireland 1995 36790 89.1 0.946 77.7 34.3 
Israel 1995 21310 73.7 0.915 79.7 52.1 
Italy 1995 27960 87.9 0.934 80.1 33.7 
Jamaica 1995 4200 61 0.738 70.8 39.~ 
Japan 1995 30750 85.5 0.943 82 31.6 
Jordan 1995 4510 55.6 0.753 71.3 50 
Kazakhstan 1995 8090 50.3 0.761 63.2 50 
Korea 1995 23360 72.8 0.901 77 32.6 
Kuwait 1995 14550 54.7 0.844 76.9 50 
Kyrgyzstan 1995 2004 61.8 0.702 66.8 50 
Latvia 1995 11862 73.5 0.836 71.6 28.5 
Libya 1995 10060 50.8 0.799 73.6 50 
Lithuania 1995 13758 75.4 0.852 72.3 33.3 
Luxembourg 1995 54690 9.7 0.949 78.5 28.9 
Macedonia 1995 7499 55 0.797 73.8 27. 
Malaysia 1995 10450 54.5 0.796 73.2 50 
Moldova 1995 2280 65.6 0.671 67.7 39 
Morocco 1995 4660 45.3 0.631 69.7 39.5 
Netherlands 1995 30920 87.8 0.943 78.4 25.2 
New Zealand 1995 25110 85.3 0.933 79.1 40.4 
Nicaragua 1995 2600 33.5 0.69 69.7 50 
Nigeria 1995 960 10.8 0.453 43.4 50 
Norway 1995 39590 95.6 0.963 79.4 25.7. 
Pakistan 1995 2340 20.4 0.527 63 50 
Panama 1995 6760 66 0.804 74.8 51.5 
Paraguay 1995 3600 58.4 0.755 71 52 
Peru 1995 5730 51.9 0.762 70 50 
Philippines 1995 4580 52.8 0.758 70.4 50 
Poland 1995 12825 88.5 0.858 74.3 29 
Portugal 1995 19530 86.2 0.904 77.2 37.4 
Qatar 1995 33840 45.6 0.849 72.8 50 
Romania 1995 8252 74.9 0.792 71.3 28.1 
Russian Federation 1995 9810 71.2 0.795 65.3 41.2 
Saudi Arabia 1995 11110 48.3 0.772 71.8 50 
Singapore 1995 32530 65.1 0.907 78.7 44.3 
Slovak Republic 1995 15513 79.6 0.849 74 50 
Slovenia 1995 21892 86.9 0.904 76.4 26.4 
South Africa 1995 10810 61.3 0.658 48.4 59 
Spain 1995 25370 85.8 0.928 79.5 33.2 
Sri Lanka 1995 3810 52.8 0.751 74 50 
Sweden 1995 30590 93.1 0.949 80.2 25.3 
Switzerland 1995 33580 83.1 0.947 80.5 50 
Syria 1995 3810 46.6 0.721 73.3 50 
Tajikistan 1995 1226 40.4 0.652 63.6 50 
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Tanzania 1995 672 22 4.495 0.418 46 50 
Thailand 1995 8140 63.8 6.43 0.778 70 50 
Trinidad and Tobago 1995 11720 59.3 6.278 0.801 69.9 50 
Tunisia 1995 7910 61.8 4.495 0.753 73.3 50 
Turkmenistan 1995 7142 38.3 4.8 0.738 62.4 50 
Uganda 1995 1450 7.7 4.87 0.508 47.3 5 
Ukraine 1995 6500 78.1 5.03 0.766 66.1 41.1 
United Kingdom 1995 31150 86.4 6.19'Z 0.939 78.4 31.5 
United States 1995 41529 79.9 7.61 0.944 77.4 38.8 
Uruguay 1995 8869 71.2 6.368 0.84 75.4 42.1 
Uzbekistan 1995 1808 57.7 4.76 0.694 66.5 50 
Venezuela 1995 4771 61.5 6.089 0.772 72.9 4l.'Z 
Vietnam 1995 2890 41.4 6.08 0.704 70.5 50 
Zimbabwe 1995 1500 32.5 3.892 0.505 36.9 73.1 
*Data compiled by author from the HDI world Development Report 1995 and 
supplementary data provided by Ed Diener at the University of Illinois. 
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